



**SDPI**  
Sustainable Development Policy Institute

# Research & News Bulletin

Vol. 14, No. 1 Jan — March 2007

## POPs HOTSPOT: Soil Contamination Due to Demolished DDT (POP) Factory Nowshera (NWFP) Pakistan

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Like other chemicals of the persistent organic pollutant (POP) group, the pesticide DDT (*dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane*), is also persistent in nature and does not degrade in the environment through biological, physical or chemical processes. Being non-degradable, DDT can travel long distances and can accumulate in animal and human bodies due to its solubility in fats. Humans and wildlife can come in contact with DDT through contaminated air, water, soil and food. Even in extremely small amounts DDT can injure human health and the health of other organisms. It is harmful to the stomach, intestines, liver and kidneys, and can affect nervous system and cause reproductive development defects and cancers and tumors. Women, children and infants are especially vulnerable to certain effects of DDT.



In 2005–6, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and the Institute of Chemical Sciences (ICS), Peshawar University, in collaboration with the NWFP Environmental Protection Agency and with support from IPEP (International POPs Elimination Project), South Asia, carried out a study to examine the adverse environmental and health impacts of residual DDT in and around a DDT manufacturing factory, Amman Gharh, Nowshera, NWFP. During the site survey and field-visits a few composite samples of soil (4), sediments (4), water

(9) and from within the factory (7) were collected in and around the factory area and chemically analyzed. The residual DDT levels in the soil samples were found to be alarmingly higher than the DDT standard minimum risk limit (MRL) for soil, despite the closure of the factory several years ago.

In view of DDT's known toxicity, accumulative characteristics and adverse environmental and health impacts, its persistence in and around the DDT factory in Amman Gharh may cause most serious consequences for ecosystem function, food safety and other aspects of human health. There is a dire need to carry out an extensive survey of the Amman Gharh area to examine DDT levels in different segments of its environment and to assess the likely impacts of DDT exposure on the general public, especially health of infants, children, women and other vulnerable groups.

For the present study, eighty-one (81) soil samples were collected within a half Km of the old gate of the factory in eight directions. These directions, as indicated by the field-compass from the rubble of construction material, were north (N), north-west (NW), west (W), south-west (SW), south (S), south-east (SE), east (E) and north-east (NE). Soil samples were collected on clear dry days during three field-visits undertaken on December 2nd (26 samples) and December 16th (25 samples) 2006 and January 11th 2007 (30 samples). Soil samples were also collected from the soil surface, at 0.15, 0.30, 0.45 & 0.60 meter depths from a single sampling point in each of the six directions.

Analytical data indicated that 90.91% of the soil samples were contaminated with DDT, with 66.6% of the samples indicating residual DDT levels higher than the DDT minimum risk level in soil (0.05 ug/g). Only soil samples examined in the North East indicated residual DDT levels (average 0.02 +/- 0.01) below the minimum risk level (MRL) of 0.05 ug/g. Soil samples collected between 325 and 520 meters in the North and North West directions also indicated residual DDT levels below MRL (between 0.01 and 0.04ug/g.) The highest residual DDT level (11.30 ug/g) was found 65 meters NW of the old factory gate. However, soil in the SE direction

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The purpose of the *SDPI Research & News Bulletin* is to communicate to the development community, private sector, government agencies and concerned citizens, SDPI's research and other activities in the area of sustainable development. It also provides information on major national and international events and issues relating to the environment and development.

The *SDPI Research & News Bulletin* is published quarterly by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute: PO Box 2342; #3, UN Boulevard, Diplomatic Enclave 1, G-5, Islamabad.

Tel:++(92-51) 2270674-6,  
2277146  
2278136  
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Printing: Print Matic

appeared to be most contaminated (average 6.70 +/- 1.25 ug/g), showing 5.19 ug/g residual DDT in soil sample collected as far away as 520 meters from the old factory gate. Soil in the South also appeared highly contaminated, with an average DDT residual level of 7.16 +/- 1.70 ug/g from 65 – 390 meters from the factory. In all directions except NE around the factory area, residual DDT levels in soil samples generally showed a decrease with increasing distance from the factory.

Soil samples at 0.15 – 0.30meter depth from N and NE directions were found to be below minimum risk level (MRL), so further depth-studies of soil in these two directions were not conducted. For soil between the surface and 0.60 meters deep, the highest residual DDT level

(5.78 +/- 3.94 ug/g) was observed in samples from the NW, followed by samples from the West (4.88 +/- 3.80 ug/g). The lowest residual DDT level (0.71 +/- 0.95 ug/g) was observed for soil samples in the SW. Except for the NW and W directions, soil samples did not show residual DDT beyond a depth of 0.45 meters. However, even at the 0.60 meter depth in the West direction, compared to MRL (0.05 ug/g) for soil, alarmingly high level (0.58 ug/g) of residual DDT was observed. A comparison of average residual DDT levels at different depths indicated a generally decreasing trend in residual DDT from 6.28 +/- 3.90 to 0.10 +/- 0.22, with increasing depth from surface to 0.60meter of the soil around the demolished DDT factory area.

It is evident from the above data that a very large area of the soil around the demolished factory is highly contaminated with DDT, despite the closure of the factory several years ago. During the field-visits, highly contaminated sites in the South, South West and South East were observed to be mostly residential areas, with houses less than 200 meters from the old factory gate. We also observed that the demolished factory compound had already become a play ground for

children and grazing/feeding place for stray cattle and free-range chickens.

The toxicity, persistency, accumulative nature, transportation and adverse environmental and health impacts of DDT, even in extremely small amounts, are well established. DDT contamination in and around the demolished DDT factory areas in Amman Gharh may cause most serious



consequences for ecosystem function, food safety and other aspects of human health, especially the health of children.

## Recommendations

We strongly recommend that the factory area be immediately declared a dangerous area. Standard "Danger" signs with inscriptions in local languages should be installed all around and the area should be banned for human activities. A fence/wall may also be constructed, at the earliest, around the factory area, to prevent entrance of children, animals, cattle, and chickens.

Exposure to DDT is known to be increased by a lack of vegetation in the affected soil: therefore, steps should be taken to plant vegetation in the area, so as to minimize the risk of continued soil toxicity.

Advocacy campaigns and awareness-raising activities should be carried out as soon as possible for the residents in the immediate surroundings of the factory area, especially for children and teachers in the schools of Amman Gargh.

Further samples should be taken from the West, South West and South directions, and samples must be taken at greater depths, as earlier sampling

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# Migration – Addressing or Importing Risk?

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**M**igration in the wake of the 2005 earthquake Migration across national borders is increasingly being seen as a strategy to alleviate poverty, to reduce vulnerability to crises and to support recovery once a disaster – be it a flood, an accident, or a business failure – has struck. This article aims to shed some light on the relationship between transnational migration, vulnerability and resilience. Whereas vulnerability relates to potential physical, social, economic and other damage, resilience means the capacity to survive, adapt to and bounce back from crisis and disaster (IFRC, 2004). The paper looks at migration on different levels, from individual women and men moving or staying back migrating or staying home, to the national level where aggregate population and remittance flows are counted.

In the wake of the October 2005 earthquake, an SDPI study conducted by Suleri and Savage (2006), a summary of which is included in Box 1, illustrates how remittances played a pivotal role for protection and recovery in the disaster-struck areas of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

## BOX 1

A large number of people from the earthquake-affected areas live abroad. For instance, Gazder (2003) reports that one in ten households in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) receive remittances. Remittances represent up to a quarter of all monthly income in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). In the villages in Districts Bagh and Muzaffarabad (AJK) and Batagram and Mansehra (NWFP) in which the study took place, 15 to 100 per cent of households were dependent on remittances. The earthquake led to widespread damage and destruction inflicted on the people and the local economy. It killed over 73,000 and affected more than three million people. An estimated 600,000 homes, 6,000 schools and 500 health facilities were destroyed. However, households whose livelihoods included remittances appeared to have been less vulnerable to the effects of the earthquake. Most of them had used the cash remitted by household members to stabilize their houses. Whereas the 7.6 magnitude shock turned their neighbors' mud and stone houses into rubble, a larger proportion of the cement mortar houses of migrant-sending families withstood the quake.

Although remittance flows were severely disrupted by the earthquake, they recovered relatively quickly. These external sources of income also

played a vital role in the recovery after the disaster. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, most of those affected were in need of food, warm clothing and shelter to protect themselves against the upcoming Himalayan winter, regardless of whether they had formerly received remittances or not. Money sent by household members outside the affected area enabled households to repair and reconstruct their homes much more easily than families without migrant members. It also meant that they had cash to pay for private health care in order to treat injuries caused by falling walls or roofs. By contrast, many households without access to remittances were compelled to rely on the much poorer public health care. In some cases, they had to sell off their meager remaining assets to pay for the treatment. In addition, remittance money made it easier for families to reach distribution points for relief aid as they could afford the travel from remote rural areas. The revival of remittance systems after the earthquake also helped restore local markets, and the spending of remittances on housing repairs has provided crucial wages for local laborers.

Source: Suleri & Savage (2006)

## Transnational migration in theory and practice


Conditions in developing countries like Pakistan are quite volatile. Most families in the rural and urban sectors alike exist close to subsistence level; poor households face serious risks to their well-being. In addition to poor health indicators, the climatic risks from crop failure, drought, and other natural disasters - as illustrated by the example above - as well as the social and economic transformations that occur during development and modernization, create a very uncertain environment. Especially in a rural setting, where weather-related problems are linked to poorly developed labor and other markets, a stable single source of income is not easily accessible. These risks at the individual, household and local levels are compounded by weak and, resultantly, unstable governments. It is no surprise that the Failed State Index 2006 ranks Pakistan number nine amongst the world's top ten failed states (Fund for Peace, 2006). All 10 members are developing or least-developed countries. Migration of family members, especially across national boundaries, is seen as a strategy to address these risks.

In economic theory, Michael P. Todaro (1969) in his seminal work on labor migration in less developed coun-

tries, regarded wage differentials as the main motivating force behind migration. The so-called Harris-Todaro model is an important formulation of the role of economic incentives in the decision to migrate. Katz & Stark (1986), on the contrary, see a broader set of motives than higher wage levels in the migrants' decisions about where to settle. The authors look at migration as a strategy to diversify risk. In the same way that investors spread their portfolio holdings to limit risks, families 'distribute' working household members to income-generating activities in different places. In contrast to sources of income in rural settings in developing countries, where a crop failure also means that fewer daily laborers will be employed and decreased purchasing power will reduce the local shopkeepers' business, international borders make earnings at home and abroad independent of each other. Foreign migration may thus be interpreted as a way of reducing risk and, resultantly, vulnerability, even if there were no differential in earnings.

Globally, some 175 million people lived outside their country of origin in 2002, and this figure is projected to reach 230 million by 2050 (UNFPA, 2004). Globally, some 175 million people lived outside their country of origin in 2002, and this figure is projected to reach 230 million by 2050 (UNFPA, 2004). About 4 million<sup>1</sup> Pakistanis - most of them men - earn their living abroad. Whereas Pakistan's surplus workers earlier migrated to the UK and

Figure 1: Distribution of Transmigrant Pakistanis by Region, 2004 (%)



Source: Overseas Pakistan Foundation (2005)


other Western countries, the oil boom in the 1970s opened greater avenues of labor migration to the Middle East.

Although labor migration to the Middle East has passed its peak, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are still the most important host countries for Pakistani workers abroad (Figure 1) and rank second and third in financial terms.

### Financial flows fighting poverty and vulnerability

As emphasized in the case study and theoretical approaches outlined above, one of the main aspects of migration is remittances. Following Todaro's interpretation, through migration, additional funds can be secured for the individual and his or her household. This is backed by evidence from Pakistan and abroad. For many people in the least developing countries, remittances are critical for meeting the basic needs of households – including food, housing, clothing, health and education (Van Door, no date). Remittances to low-income countries were larger as a share of GDP and imports than were those to middle income countries. For example, in the poor Caribbean state of Haiti, remittances represent about 17 per cent of GDP. In Somalia, following the collapse of a formal government in the early 1990s, remittances from the Somali diaspora based in the Gulf States as well as countries in Europe and North America, became a critical survival resource for many families (Kapur, 2004). This is widely assumed to have reduced poverty levels. According to a World Bank simulation, an increase in the share of remittances in a country's GDP by one tenth would result in a 1.6% reduction in the number of people living in poverty in that country (World Bank, 2003). Transnational migration from Pakistan has been fetching a large amount of foreign exchange in the form of remittances.

Figure 2: Remittances, exports, FDI and official development aid flows to Nepal, 2000-2004 (million USD)



Source: World Bank (2006)

During the last fiscal year, workers' aggregate remittances surpassed USD 4 billion (OPF, 2005). This is about half the export income during the same period.

Remittance flows are not only the second-largest source of external funding for developing countries behind foreign direct investment (FDI), they are also more stable than private capital flows. While the latter tend to rise during favorable economic cycles and fall in bad times, remittances, by contrast, are less volatile and may

1. In 2005 the Government of Pakistan estimated that around 7 million Pakistanis, including illegal /over-stayers and students, were staying abroad (OPF, 2005).

even rise in response to economic cycles in the recipient country. For example, remittances to developing countries continued to grow steadily in 1998–2001 when private capital flows declined in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Even the more stable components of capital flows—FDI and official development aid (ODA)—decreased in 2000–01, while remittances continued to rise (Kapur, 2004).

Despite the comparative dependence on external aid flows, Nepal's remittances have overtaken them in recent years (Figure 2). Whereas export volatility reflects the political instability during the past years, remittances have over-compensated the decline. Katz & Stark (1986) in their interpretation of remittances as a risk-reducing strategy, focused on the household level. The role of remittances during and after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan provides an illustration for the related reduction in household's vulnerability. Beyond the household level, this effect is also evident at the level of the macro-economy and explains policy makers' interest in migration management and remittance management.

### The downside of transnational migration

Despite these real and perceived benefits of migration for the individual, household and the state, there is also a downside of transnational migration. Risks are not only addressed by but can also originate from cross-border movements. In particular, female family members who stay back may become very dependent on their male (agnate) relatives for protection and for loans. Rogaly & Rafique (2003) find that women in households with a single male earner rely more heavily than others on social relations outside their household to keep things going during their husband's absences. This dependence also affects the level of the household. Rather than supporting diversification, as predicted in theory, poor households often become economically dependent on remittance flows as indicated in the case study above, albeit in a post-disaster situation. If the migration opportunities themselves, or the cash flows they generate, prove to be unreliable, new crises can occur. This was seen during the 2005 earthquake. Immediately after the disaster, the communication and financial infrastructure of the affected areas collapsed and it took some time before it could be restored to re-establish remittance flows, amongst other things. Hence, the remittance dependent households' vulnerability actually increased during this time period (Suleri & Savage, 2006). Siegmann & Steimann (2005) find irregular remittances to represent one of the major financial crises for households in rural NWFP.

Risks may arise for physical and mental health of both of the migrants themselves or their household members who stay back. Kaspar (2005) shows for the case of Nepali out-migrants that male migration to India or the Middle East may be a double-edged sword for their wives. Together with increased decision-making power in the household, their work burden also increases. The '*Dubai chalo!*' slogan of Pakistani migrants to the Gulf states has become the label

for a socio-psychological stress syndrome. It manifests itself in disorientation resulting from social isolation, culture shock, harsh working conditions and the sudden acquisition of relative wealth (*CIA World Factbook*, no date).

Ageing populations, the incorporation of women into the

**This dependence also affects the level of the household. Rather than supporting diversification, as predicted in theory, poor households often become economically dependent on remittance flows as indicated in the case study above, albeit in a post-disaster situation.**

labor market and the lack of public services for the care of dependants in industrialized countries, has resulted in the migration of – mainly female - care providers from poor countries, such as Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003 in Ramirez, Dominguez & Morais, 2005) coined the phrase 'global care chains' to describe the importation of care from developing to developed countries. However, especially for the migrants' families, the labor export to smooth financial flows may imply the import of psycho-social problems. Literature about global care chains is infused with debates about what happens to children and the elderly who are left behind.

Mobile populations, including labor migrants, are more likely to have unsafe sex, increasing the risk of HIV/AIDS infection. Although, with around 3,000 cases reported since 1986, HIV/AIDS is not a dominant epidemic in Pakistan, patriarchal gender norms that make it difficult for women to demand safe sex make it a high risk country<sup>2</sup>. The health-related risks have an obvious economic dimension if the outbreak of the illness leads to the inability to work and earn an income.

At the level of developing states, the migration of skilled workers - the so-called 'brain drain' - is another major piece of the migration debate. Clearly, the international mobility of skilled workers is a crucial issue for middle- and low-income countries, mainly because their share of well-educated workers remains low compared with that of high-income countries. Through the brain drain to the industrialized countries, they lose the skilled labor force that is crucial for their development. This phenomenon is massive in small and poor developing nations – with over 50 per cent of college graduates leaving countries in the Caribbean and Central

2. According to UNAIDS estimates, some 70,000 to 80,000 persons, or 0.1 per cent of the adult population in Pakistan, are infected with HIV/AIDS. The vast majority of them are unreported due to social taboos about sex and victims' fears of discrimination (World Bank, 2005).

America. In some of them, the figure is as high as 80 per cent (World Bank, 2005 in Docquier & Marfouk, 2006). Paradoxically, then, a strategy that might buffer economic risks for individuals and households leaves developing states even more vulnerable.

### Reducing risk through migration, and addressing migration-related risks

The evidence presented above highlights the fact that the continuing preoccupation of states with managing migration flows can be at odds with the development agenda. Transnational migration has the capacity for individuals and households and for developing countries to improve their socio-economic conditions and protect themselves against volatile political, economic and social conditions. However, a shift in focus from financial flows to migrants' moves reveals that, just as migration can address the risks of poor and vulnerable households, in certain cases, there is an importation of risk along with resilience. The increasing mobility of laborers can lead to the spread of highly infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS and households' increased dependence on remittances has meant a brain drain from developing countries.

Hence, the challenge is to take a holistic view of migrants' livelihoods rather than focus on financial flows alone. This also calls for a shift in the research agenda, taking multi-local livelihoods and their consequences for the individual, the household, community and the state into account. Given the diversity and volume of migration flows, it is important that states come up with a coherent migration policy so that potentials for reducing vulnerability and strengthening resilience can be identified and tapped. Similarly, migration-related risks at various levels should not be ignored but require mitigation strategies by the government, civil society, and other stakeholders.

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2. According to UNAIDS estimates, some 70,000 to 80,000 persons, or 0.1 per cent of the adult population in Pakistan, are infected with HIV/AIDS. The vast majority of them are unreported due to social taboos about sex and victims' fears of discrimination (World Bank, 2005).

# The Army's Role in Humanitarian Assistance

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An earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale jolted parts of Azad Kashmir and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) on October 8, 2005. Vast areas were devastated, including the major towns of Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Balakot, Mansehra, and Battagram. The untold loss of human life and property touched deep, collective chords of goodwill. The civil society response in particular - although inchoate at times - was spontaneous and heartwarming. Inevitably, however, the fractured nature of this response subsumed it within an institutional context. This is borne out historically; the periodic recurrence of disasters and their potential to cause massive destruction has, over the past century, triggered state-level coping responses, involving both agencies and institutionalized processes.

The Army is a key agency called upon to intervene, primarily due to its rapid response capabilities in undertaking rescue and relief operations. The Army has a comparative advantage in logistics, infrastructure, manpower and organizational efficiency. Recent natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the Asian Tsunami have seen the active involvement of the Army. The commander of the US First Army headed the Joint Task Force Katrina. The Pakistan Army has also intervened when natural calamities have occurred. It orchestrated relief operations during the floods in northern Punjab in 2001 and in the aftermath of the 1992 floods in the Indus Basin delta. The October 8, 2005 earthquake was no exception. In fact, the Army's subsequent role in earthquake operations could be viewed as a natural corollary to its overwhelming presence in AJ&K.

However, this is where an anomaly emerges. An extreme analogy could be that, like fire and water, the army is a good servant but a bad master. In other words, the absence of institutional checks has created space for the Pakistan army to extend its operations well beyond rescue and relief, as well as to determine the manner of their implementation. This has raised concerns about misgovernance and the institutional sustainability of relief and rehabilitation efforts. Rather than civilian institutions defining the army's role within a constitutional-legislative framework, the Army has arrogated this role to itself and, in the process, has imposed its own internal norms of accountability and transparency. It would surely have had these norms beforehand.

The article looks at relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Thematically, it highlights governance, transparency, sustainability, and coordination issues across these activities. An SDPI team of two researchers and two enumerators obtained feedback on these themes from a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including affected com-

munities, community-based organizations (CBO), Non-government Organizations (NGOs), International NGOs, Line Department staff, donor agencies, local government representatives, journalists, teachers and the Earthquake Relief and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA). We also got site-specific feedback from four affected districts: Battagram and Mansehra in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Bagh and Muzaffarabad in (AJ&K).

## A non-constitutional mandate

Pakistan's Constitution clearly assigns post-disaster relief and rehabilitation functions to the civil administration. Before the Local Government Ordinance (LGO) of 2001, provincial governments could mobilize the state machinery in times of natural crisis. The LGO shifted all disaster-related responsibilities to the local governments, with the District Nazim as the chief coordinator. The civilian administration has the discretion to request the involvement of the military, in which case its mandate is set on a case-by-case basis.

The response to the October 8, 2005 earthquake violated this Constitutional imperative. The Army masquerades as a civilian entity, especially with regard to rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. This civilian aspect is a guise, representing more form than substance: essentially, the Army retains firm control over policy and management functions. Both the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) and the Earthquake Relief and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) were formed extra-constitutionally, with no legislative approval being sought for either, despite pressure to do so. Interestingly, ERRA's charter provides military personnel impunity from any legal action related to any earthquake related task (Rizvi, 2005).

It did not help that the earthquake destroyed every single government office in the affected areas, in effect crippling what little capacity for local government that had existed. Currently, all Government offices in the affected areas in AJ&K are housed in tents and the local government currently wields little or no authority. When NGOs wish to engage in development projects, they must apply to ERRA for 'No Objection Certificates' (NOCs), to which a token signature from a local government official is appended.

The army points to the lack of capacity to respond effectively, claiming that it is the only viable institution in the country that can cope with disasters on a large scale. It asserts that there are no comparable civilian institutions which could complement or supplant it. While this is true, it ignores the behavioral context where the army itself has eroded civilian institutions. Ergo, it cannot invoke institutional and administrative *lacunae* when it created them in

## Features

the first place. The absence of alternative coping mechanisms has given the army *carte blanche* and has raised concerns about governance and institutional sustainability. As affectees and as recipients of assistance, the communities are best placed to comment on issues of transparency and accountability. What follows is a distillation of views obtained from focus group discussions with communities and key respondent interviews.

### Stakeholder perceptions

#### 1. Rescue and relief

The Army deployed over 50,000 troops in the region in a matter of three to four days, made possible by the existing border concentrations. It cleared landslides and re-established communication and road links, facilitating the movement of other organizations, some of which were already present in the affected areas. These included the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), SUNGI Development Foundation and ActionAid. Foreign organizations (including the Turkish Red Crescent Society and official country teams, including that of Cuba) were also able to reach the affected areas in record time. They immediately began coordinating with the Army to recover people from the debris with the help of sophisticated detectors, and providing emergency medical aid and high energy rations. Local organizations, such as Islamic Relief and *Al Khidmat* Foundation were also active. Army trucks transported the majority of the families back to villages like Alai and Ghari Habibullah, from the relief camps. Even the most vocal detractors agreed that the Army had moved rapidly and efficiently to clear blocked roads. By most accounts, the Abbotabad and Bagh roads were cleared the first day, and the Kohala road by the second day. The more severely damaged routes to the Neelum and Jhelum valleys, which had been put down to several months of work by foreign organizations, were cleared for use in 45 and 20 days, respectively.

The Army Medical Corp deployed extensively throughout the region to provide medical aid and worked in close coordination with foreign medical teams. Army Aviation immediately began airlifting the injured and bringing in supplies. Divisions from Sindh and the Punjab began reaching the affected areas within three to four days. The Army conducted a damage and emergency needs assessment, providing baseline information which it shared with other relief agencies and organizations. The survey also provided a planning basis for relief operations over a vast area. Once the Army had consolidated its presence in the affected areas, it began hosting 'cluster meetings' every evening with all concerned NGOs, CBOs, and donor organizations. The intention was to coordinate efforts, present progress reports, and avoid duplication.

On reaching the affected areas, the Army set up 'distribution hubs'. These were large supply camps located in easily recognizable and accessible areas, on plain tracts of land and at a reasonable distance from potential rock falls and flood-prone areas. Large numbers

of civilians were able to obtain blankets and essential rations such as flour, lentils, rice, ghee, sugar, and tea. However, critics point to an insufficiency of aid to many areas, and to deficiencies in the chit system instituted by the Army. Community members complained that that Army NCOs managing these camps were often rude and abusive. They faulted the system which forced them to stand in long lines all day, turning them away in the evenings and instructing them to return the following day. Army spokesmen defended their stance, stating that civilian families were flocking to the camps and that many among them were hoarders. The only way to control the numbers and prevent hoarding was to employ a 'tough-love' strategy.

**As affectees and as recipients of assistance, the communities are best placed to comment on issues of transparency and accountability.**

The larger donors, such as the World Bank and the UNDP, are comfortable with the army's role. The UNDP, in particular, praised the Army on how it coordinated and facilitated the UNDP efforts. Until June 2006, the local Commanders continued to hold periodic briefing sessions with representatives of international agencies and other non-military actors to inform them of the on-ground situation, a move which raised the level of response efficiency from non-military actors. The major official camps set up camp management organizations, led by either a local military commander or a civilian organization, with decisions being taken consensually, rather than in typically directive fashion. The UN agencies operating in the affected areas were extremely well received by the Army and have commented that they were provided with 24-hour security, lifting machinery for creating flat ground for NGO camps, and trucks, as and when required. The interaction between the two is said to be so positive that the UN is considering redrafting internal policies that prohibit interaction with the armed forces. Foreign NGOs and aid organizations hold similar opinions.

Two acts stood in jarring contrast to the army's 'humanitarian' role, both accentuating the primacy of organizational and strategic imperatives. It is clear now that Army divisions in AJ&K were badly hit. While Army helicopters reached the affected areas within a few hours of the earthquake, they are said to have evacuated only army personnel. Civilians were rescued later, although many village communities claim that army helicopters never reached them; instead, they themselves carried their injured to hospitals or to helipads. Second, the Army rejected India's generous offer to provide helicopters and pilots for relief operations. There was not even a pretense of negotiations: for instance, the Army could

have insisted on the helicopters being flown by Pakistani pilots. As further affirmation, in many areas in AJ&K the Army invoked strategic reasons to block civilian aid trucks and transferred the goods to their own camps for further distribution. This led to criticism from various NGOs that the Army had attempted to divert their aid supplies to its camps with hoarding in mind. Some NGOs submitted to the pressure, while others flatly refused to do so.

Not surprisingly, the Army's dominant presence has defined the command and control mode of relief operations. In contrast, democratic governance would have been more likely to have ensured participatory and community-based needs assessment, coupled with internal social checks on predatory behavior. In terms of the need to respect community pride and sensitivities, both the Army and civil society resorted to practices that demeaned local communities, diminished their self-respect, and reduced them to looting and hoarding. The record points to cases of relief goods being flung out of helicopters indiscriminately; of the army's inability/reluctance to distribute relief goods among widows and the elderly who could not travel to the relief distribution centers; of private trucks dumping second hand clothes on the roads in their haste to get back to the plains, which remained where they were strewn and of mounds of mineral water bottles

accumulating on the roads around Bagh where they were not needed.

## 2. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

The Army has a tangible, albeit covert, presence in reconstruction activities. The ERRA, which oversees these activities, claims to be a civilian body reporting to the Prime Minister. Ostensibly, the Army's active role within ERRA is limited to road and rubble clearing and conducting structural (housing) damage surveys in coordination with civilian members of the survey teams. In addition, however, ERRA calls on military personnel deployed in the affected areas to conduct one-off (special) tasks, such as closing mobile radio stations which broadcast inflammatory messages.

In reality, the army retains a firm grip on ERRA's policy, management and technical functions. As a token concession it has inducted a former Minister, Saleem Altaf, as the ERRA chief, but he remains a figurehead, with General Nadeem Ahmed, the Deputy Chief making the decisions. An examination of ERRA's organization chart reveals the extent of Army dominance. The 'command and control' stamp is evident in all of ERRA's operations as well.

The organization's own telephone directory and or-

**Table 1. Army involvement at ERRA Headquarters**

Designations within ERRA HQ									
		Director Chairman Office	Deputy chairman	Section Officer to Deputy Chairman	Director General	Deputy Director General	Director	Deputy Director	Structural Engineer
ERRA Departments	Chairman office	Lieutenant Colonel							
	Deputy chairman office		Lieutenant General	Major					
	Executive wing				Brigadier	Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Major	Lieutenant Colonel
	Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) wing				Brigadier	Colonel		Two Majors	
	Planning wing							Major	
	Transitional recovery cell (TRC)				Major General		One Brigadier and one Lieutenant Colonel	One Lieutenant Colonel, and four Majors	
	Legal and procurement wing								
	Finance wing								

Source: ERRA, 2006

ganizational chart show the extent to which the army is involved in the ostensibly 'civilian' outfit, ERRA. ERRA is not dominated by the Army in terms of sheer numbers, but the Army officials that *are* involved are fairly senior within the army, *and* hold reasonably senior positions in the organization. Below is a list of departments within ERRA, of which only the last two contain no Army personnel. As Table 1 shows, senior Army officers head three major departments within ERRA, not counting the Chairman office.

The local governments have been stripped off their Constitutional role to manage post-disaster events, and all their functions are being conducted under military oversight. Where Nazims have been allowed to call stakeholder consultative meetings, the local military Commanders have maintained a check on the activities and ended up dictating them. In particular, the AJK government has acted as little more than a puppet for the military establishment, echoing its subservience in other areas as well. All non-military actors working in the earthquake areas are required to present project proposals and funding sources to ERRA, which then registers them

**The ban on reconstruction in devastated towns, particularly in Balakot and Bagh, is resented. The residents of Bagh have become dismissive about the long-promised Master Plan and have started rebuilding and repair work, in defiance of the construction ban.**

and allows the project to be executed.

ERRA hired the services of the National Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET), Nepal, to design earthquake resistant homes. The standardized design was approved by the World Bank and linked with the monetary compensation that is supposed to be provided to each family. Neither affordable nor culturally appropriate, the design is a testament to donor insensitivity – to common sense deferring to turf concerns. The UN-Habitat did not hesitate to point out the design flaws, which have now been rectified. But, this is a classic case of too little too late. As an OXFAM survey<sup>1</sup> pointed out, only 17% of the affectees have rebuilt their homes, as another harsh winter settles in, forcing large numbers of people to be displaced again.

The communities view building payments as com-

pensation and, evidently, have complained that they are not enough to meet their needs. The ERRA has countered that these are aid payments to help people begin rebuilding their homes according to international standards for seismic resistance. However, the debate becomes moot in view of the complications in the actual manner of payment. Almost every family received ERRA's first payment of Pak Rupees (PKR) 25,000/-. The procedure, however, was flawed inasmuch as some households received the money on a per-family basis, while other received it on a per-roof (i.e. extended family) basis. The second and third payments of PKR 75,000/- and PKR 50,000/-, respectively, are contingent upon completing the plinth (foundation) and the walls. This both restricts the size of the house and does not reflect the differentials in transport and material costs. ERRA has established distribution hubs for subsidized building materials (steel and cement) in the affected Districts but the communities complain there are not enough of them, nor are they accessible to the more remote areas. As noted earlier, communities are frustrated with the compensation process which has delayed reconstruction; in particular, the process disenfranchises the landless and those who have lost their land records. Army officers in charge of distribution hubs reportedly were unwilling to meet with communities to hear their complaints, providing such access only to those with Army connections.

The Army used local patwaris to identify damaged houses. OXFAM states<sup>2</sup> that these patwaris charge inflated fees for issuing essential documents that survivors need to claim their compensation. Evidently, some of them have demanded up to 50% of the compensation payments before agreeing to sign the documents. Not surprisingly, the FGDs and interviews revealed low payments of the final installment. Against ERRA's claimed disbursement of 70-80%, these were stated to be as low as 30%. ERRA maintains that the reasons for the delays in the 'small' number of undecided cases is rooted in unclear data entry on forms, duplicate form numbers, and duplicate identity card numbers.

ERRA has established progress-monitoring teams (PMTs) to oversee building progress and compliance. While the PMTs are required to include civil society members, by the army's own admission, they tend to be dominated by its own personnel. This has caused friction at times between the PMTs and NGO technical staff, over building assessments.

The ban on reconstruction in devastated towns, particularly in Balakot and Bagh, is resented. The residents of Bagh have become dismissive about the long-promised Master Plan and have started rebuilding and repair work, in defiance of the construction ban. Balakot residents, with ancestral and community ties, have refused to relocate to Bakrial and have begun to rebuild, ignoring the building codes. Muzaffarabad residents, too, became

*Continued on page 19*

1. Oxfam, Keeping recovery on course: Challenges facing the Pakistan earthquake response one year on, Oxfam Briefing Note, October 2006.  
2. Ibid.

# A Framework of Barriers

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The hopes from SAFTA (South Asia Free Trade Agreement) were never too high as far as trade liberalisation between Pakistan and India was concerned. It was a common perception that political differences between Pakistan and India would render SAFTA meaningless. The predictions came true at the conclusion of the second SAFTA ministerial conference in Kathmandu in February 2007, when Pakistan complained that India had decided to withdraw tariff concessions extended to Pakistan under the Agreement. India was quick to deny the accusation and blamed Pakistan for not implementing SAFTA in letter and spirit. Although things did not get any worse, the question was raised again: "Can SAFTA be a meaningful regional trade agreement with the existing attitudes of Indian and Pakistani policy makers?"

One would have to look into the history of SAFTA ratification to comprehend the problem. At the time of SAFTA ratification in 2006 Pakistan had three options. The first one was not to ratify the SAFTA draft: this would have given Pakistan a bad name. The second option was to ratify SAFTA and initiate trade on a negative list (*i.e.*, a list of "non tradable" items) basis. This would have practically provided 'Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) status to India, as trade in items not part of negative list would have been liberalized. The third alternative for Pakistan was to deal with SAFTA and an 'importable items' list from India separately. Pakistan ratified the SAFTA, keeping in view the third option: limiting SAFTA tariff concessions for India to 773 items existing in a bilateral 'positive list' (*i.e.* a list of tradable items).

Pakistan decided to link free trade with India to visible progress on political issues between the two countries, including the Kashmir issue, through a composite dialogue. Pakistan also presented the argument that opening up trade with India would not be in favour of Pakistan as the latter's trade balance with India was already negative.

India had given MFN status to Pakistan in 1996. However, Pakistan complains about the excessive use of non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) by Indian counterparts and argues that reduction in tariffs through MFN status is meaningless while the NTBs prevail. Here it should be kept in mind that Indian NTBs are not Pakistan-specific only. Even the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in its recent review of Indian trade policy, has identified many NTBs.

India, on the other hand, feels that Pakistan is working against the spirit of SAFTA by limiting Indian imports to a positive list (that now contains more than 1,000 items) instead of a negative list as per the SAFTA agreement. India is also demanding a reciprocal "Most

Favored Nation treatment".

Human beings tend to not follow a win-win paradigm; most of the time they tend to follow win-lose paradigm (my victory should be at the cost of someone's loss). However, India-Pakistan trade relations present a lose-lose paradigm: if I cannot win then you will not win either. The 'lose-lose' paradigm followed by policy makers on both side of the border is clearly evident in a study conducted by The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) in 2005. The study, titled 'Implications of liberalising trade and investment with India', calls for the liberalisation of trade with India which, it believes, would benefit both nations. It predicts that Pakistan would benefit more, with imports mopping up net savings ranging from US\$ 400 to 900 million. The study estimates that if Pakistan-India trade were to open up, bilateral trade volume could cross US\$ 5.2 billion. The study also reveals that both countries had achieved only two per cent of their total bilateral trade potential during the past 25 years.

According to the report, 32 per cent of Pakistan's export products are currently bought by India from other countries and constitute one third of India's total imports. The report notes that about 1,181 items worth US \$ 3.9 billion, covering 45 per cent of the total items exported by Pakistan, were at par with India's imports during 2004.

The report indicates that about 70.3 per cent of the common items exported from Pakistan have unit values less than or equal to Indian imports' unit values, and there is a large scope for the export of those items simply by producing the quality required by India.

The SBP study also shows that India currently earns US\$ 15 billion in export revenue from 2,646 items being imported by Pakistan from other countries and notes that in 2004 the unit value for Pakistan's imports was higher than the unit value of Indian exports for 48.7 per cent of these items. Forty five per cent of those common imports were not included in the Pakistan positive list and hence their import from India was not allowed. Pakistan was losing US\$400 million to 900 million dollars by importing those items from other sources.

Some of the recommendations of SBP report do make sense. However, Pakistan would have to open up its trade with India in order to test the validity of the SBP's hypothesis. This is a difficult task, especially keeping in view Pakistan's record trade deficit which is predicted to exceed US\$ 12 billion by the end of the current financial year.

In my opinion Pakistan will not be willing to open up trade any further with India for the time being. There is no indication that India would reduce its NTBs (either for Pakistan or for the rest of the world). At the same time

India has made it clear to Pakistan that there cannot be a qualified implementation of SAFTA. India has the option to deny SAFTA benefits to Pakistan because it is not receiving similar benefits from Pakistan under the agreement. India does not feel any dependency on SAFTA: as a recent World Bank study indicates, in 2004, the total combined imports of goods and services of the four largest countries in South Asia other than India (i.e., Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) were US\$ 48,978 million, while Indian exports were US\$ 115,233 million. Even if all of India's South Asian neighbors decided to import goods from India only, the country still needs to export US\$66,255 million worth of goods and services outside SAFTA.

We have already observed that in case of a deadlock in the multilateral trading regime (WTO) things start moving towards bilateral trading regimes and countries tend to rely on free/preferential trade agreements with each other. The same holds true when things get stuck in regional trading agreements such as SAFTA. Both Pakistan and India are trying to sign FTAs with their South Asian neighbours. Both Pakistan and India have already signed separate FTAs with Sri Lanka and efforts are being made to do the same with Bangladesh.

India is a major partner in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). BIMSTEC consists of Bangladesh,

India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. This sub-regional group has already signed a framework Free Trade Agreement and is aiming to transform into a free-trade agreement in the long run. Nepal is also receiving a preferential trading arrangement with India. China is about to join BIMSTEC as an observer. This leaves Pakistan out, as it is not part of BIMSTEC and would be unable to join BIMSTEC without a green signal from India so basically Pakistan would lose its regional market.

Two important questions remain: What is the fate of SAFTA? And why should Pakistani and Indian consumers pay premium prices for commodities they get through informal trade or through third countries like Dubai or Singapore?

Looking at the most recent trends (apart from daily food items), Pakistan is deficient in raw cotton and corrugated sheets that India may supply at a cheaper rate. Similarly India is deficient in wheat and cement and can import these from Pakistan. However, committed political will from the top and a strong push from the bottom are required if the *status quo* is to be changed.

Our policy makers should think "out of the box" and should focus on complementarities with a pro-people approach. The aim should not be to sign another Free Trade Agreement: rather, it should be to provide relief to the common person and to visualise a new South Asia free from hunger and poverty.

*Continued form page 2*

## **POPS HOTSPOT: Soil Contamination Due to Demolished DDT (POP) Factory Nowshera (NWFP) Pakistan**

found unacceptable levels of DDT at locations 550 meters from the factory gate and 0.6 meters deep.

In order to evaluate the risk associated with the DDT-contaminated site, studies using bio-indicators like eggs, adipose tissue, milk, fish, birds, endocrine disruption and cholinesterase levels should be initiated in these areas. Earlier reports have indicated high DDT levels in the eggs sampled near Peshawar, NWFP.

The presence of high level of DDT in the soil samples indicates the persistence of DDT in this high temperature zone of Pakistan, though there were earlier reports that DDT may not be persistent in this part of the world. The present study necessitates a fresh look into those findings.

There is also a dire need to identify other DDT (and other POPs 'hot spots') in the country and to investigate the exposure levels and resulting health threats to local populations in areas where the formulation, storage and application of DDT had been conducted.

Further work is also needed to see if other toxic degradation products like DDE are present in the vicinity of the demolished DDT factory.

This study has indicated the most alarming situation of DDT residues in soil samples. There is a need to look into the feasibility of employing the reported processes for decontamination of DDT from the soil in and around the factory area. Pakistan's National Implementation Plan (NIP), obligatory under Article 7 of the Stockholm Convention, elaborates the current situation on POPs, including DDT, and states the commitment and actions that the Government intends to undertake in the management and control of POPs for the next 15 years starting from 2007. Among the challenges in the management of POPs, NIP identifies the lack of facilities for safe disposal of wastes (consisting of, containing or contaminated with POPs) and the very limited and financial and technical resources for remediation of the contaminated sites. Details of activities for rational management of POPs pesticides, including obsolete stocks and contaminated sites by 2010 are also contained in the NIP document.

Pakistan needs to ratify Stockholm Convention as soon as possible, so that with the in-coming financial and technical support from the developed countries, as agreed in Articles 12 (3) & 13 (2) of the Convention, the activities outlined in NIP may be started.

# In Retrospect

## Campaigns and Talks



### Is a Free and Fair Election Possible in Pakistan?

January 15, 2007

While questioning the possibility of free and fair elections, the speakers demanded the formation of a consensus-based national caretaker government and an autonomous and independent Election Commission. They also insisted on allowing the participation of the exiled leadership of the PPPP and the PML (N) in the coming elections in order to restore real democracy in the country. The speakers warned that the country could face a 1971-like situation if free and fair elections were not held in Pakistan, which was likely to happen under the present government led by General Pervaiz Musharraf.

Mr. Iqbal Zafar Jhagra, Secretary General of ARD, lamented that the way the present government was doing the things clearly suggested that the coming general elections would be the most rigged elections in the history of the country. He said that the President has to be a symbol of unity acceptable to all stakeholders and that the President must ensure a level playing field to all political forces, adding that unfortunately, the present unelected President was manipulating all the political process to create a favorable environment for his "king's party". He strongly objected to the President's participation in such public meetings, appeals to the nation and oversight of Ministers' abuse of powers. He also decried public statements that refuse to allow the leadership of popular political parties to take part in the election process, which was in fact a violation of law of the land. "The nation would stand up as it happened in 1971 if the citizens were denied their basic right to choose or reject their political representatives in the coming elections" he warned. He referred to a detailed report of the European Parliament, which outlined its observations regarding General Musharraf's manipulative role in the different elections held during his tenure. Responding to a question, he said that the proposed All Parties Conference would chalk out a joint strategy determining whether or not to participate in the upcoming elections.

B. A. Malik, former Ambassador of Pakistan and central leader of PPPP, cautioned that if General Musharraf remained in power, the nation would have to forget about the possibility of free and fair elections in the country. He said that the country's institutions have been virtually broken; the Election Commission cannot play any independent role and the judiciary has always been generous towards legitimizing the successive military takeovers. He feared that in the presence of General Musharraf the country was likely to experience the highest degree of interference in elections ever

experienced.

Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, Executive Director of the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency (PILDAT) discussed different aspects of the election process. He identified five major stakeholders: the people, political parties, the present government, the Election Commission of Pakistan and the Judiciary. Talking separately about each of these stakeholders, he said people have no trust or interest in the election process; the political parties were disorganized; the present government's and the President's neutrality was questionable, the willingness or ability of the Election Commission was weak and finally, the "mixed-racket" role of the Judiciary was another serious issue which had a strong effect on the election process in the country.

During the vibrant question and answer session, the participants raised questions about the accountability, transparency and fairness within the major political parties such as the PML (N) and the PPPP. Another issue was the need for increased public pressure on General Musharraf's regime for the conduct of transparent, free and fair elections. Some people questioned the effectiveness of the media and civil society with regard to building a genuine pressure, which could compel the government for the free and fair elections.

### Public-Private Partnerships in Primary Education: Prospects and Challenges"

January 22, 2007

While highlighting the importance of Public-Private Partnership (PPPs) in education, the experts called upon the Government to introduce a comprehensive legal framework for strengthening and effective functioning of PPPs in education, with a view to ensuring direct community participation for better provision and improving the quality of primary education in the country.

Dr. Faisal Bari of the Mahbub-ul-haq Human Development Center (Islamabad) said that the role of the community in PPPs was becoming very important, especially after the devolution of power to the District level. He stressed that, apart from the intrinsic value of education as a human right, public money has to support education, as an uneducated child was burden on both parents and the country. He maintained that neither the public nor the private sector in Pakistan alone could shoulder the challenge of providing quality education to the whole population. He noted that the concept of PPPs in education sector was not a new phenomenon adding that it had prevailed in Pakistan since the 1990s, as

different broad-based institutional arrangements functioning in the country.

The private sector, he noted, supported the improved functioning of public-sector schools. The institutional arrangements to achieve this included the support of comparatively informal school management committees/parent-teacher associations (SMCs/PTAs) at the community level for the improvement of school infrastructure and quality of teaching, as well as the 'Adopt-a-School' program. Based on his research findings, he said that collaborations involving the community yield better results if they come into being organically. A range of NGOs, such as CARE Lahore, hybrids like the Rural Support Programmes and public bodies such as the National Commission for Human Development have actively encouraged the improvement of public education institutions through private funding and management. He also mentioned, however, the "reverse collaboration" in which public partners support the outreach and quality of private schools. This model, as represented in the work of the education foundations, was uncommon in the Pakistani context. Dr. Bari strongly urged more experimentation in the area of PPPs for improved education, as successful models for urban Punjab might not be the "silver bullets" for rural Balochistan.

Tanya Khan of the Rural Support Programmes Network, while discussing the broader issues in PPPs, shared the experiences and 'lessons learnt' of the private sector in PPPs in the education sector in general and of the RSPs in particular. She stressed that the direct role of the community was becoming extremely important in strengthening PPPs in Pakistan. She said although the concept of PPPs had prevailed in Pakistan during the 1990s, the concept actually dated back to the 1980s. She emphasized that some of the issues, which came out of those PPPs experiences, needed to be addressed to help this concept to flourish. She noted that although in the recent years the PPPs were gaining momentum in Pakistan, the concept still faced many constraints. "The government was still controlling certain areas, which discouraged the emergence of effective and meaningful partnerships between the private and public sectors" she added. According to Ms Khan, the key issues included: the involvement of all stakeholders; ownership of the project at the private and government levels; resistance from both private and public institutions on various grounds; co-ordination between stakeholders; clarity of roles, reporting structures; financial issues; the capacities of both public and private institutions and above all the acceptance and participation of community members, for whom there have to be clear roles and responsibilities.

Dr. A. H. Nayyer of SDPI presided over the Seminar and noted that under the 1973 Constitution, basic education was the fundamental right of the children of Pakistan. However, successive governments had failed to meet this obligation and millions of children have been denied the right to schooling. Apart from that, the quality of public education remained extremely poor.

During the question and answer session, the participants raised numerous concerns, which included the dual education system; unequal opportunities; the absence of national standards for quality education and the elimination of political interference from the education system.

### **Code of Conduct for NGOs: A Civil Society Perspective**

February 14, 2007

While declaring it an ambiguous, contradictory and direct violation of the law of the land, representatives and experts from civil society organizations completely rejected the Government's proposed draft Code of Conduct for NGOs, which was seen as a politically motivated move by the government to distract public attention from other important national issues facing the nation today.

Shahnaz Wazir Ali of the Centre for Philanthropy (CPC) said that circumstances suggested that the motive for introducing the Code of Conduct was basically initiated from within the inner circles of the government to achieve political objectives. The draft Code of Conduct was unnecessary and redundant, and thus was not acceptable to civil society. She questioned the intent behind it and demanded that the government should make the consultation process broad-based, transparent and participatory, allowing all stakeholders to give their input before finalizing such an important document.

Harris Khalique of Strengthening Participatory Organizations endorsed this view and added that the CoC was not only politically motivated, but was also to further confuse and cause conflicts between the various existing laws and regulatory bodies governing the not-for-profit/NGO sector, citing the SECP, Social Welfare, Trusts, Companies Registrar, Cooperatives, Industries and Wafaq-ul-Madaris for Madrassahs. He strongly objected to the draft language (English) of the CoC, which was only accessible on the Internet, although the majority of rural NGOs/CBOs have neither electricity nor access to computers or the Internet. He added that the CoC was prepared by UK-based consultants from The Charities Commission and was thus not an indigenous exercise.

Mohammad Tahseen of the South Asia Partnership, Pakistan informed the audience that there was no objection to a Code of Conduct in principle; rather, the intent, manner, process, implementation mechanism and the rationale behind the government's drafted CoC were being questioned. Furthermore, he voiced the concern that the draft CoC would be the precursor to a new Bill to curtail the NGOs' freedom. He reminded the audiences of the three previous attempts to introduce the same kind of draconian Bills under successive governments. "Each time the vigilant NGOs have rejected these mala fide moves and ulterior motives of those successive governments," he added. "Since the NGO federations, forums and coalitions have already drafted their own

voluntary Code of Conduct, and were abiding by it, we neither need nor accept the government's move and reject the draft CoC."

On behalf of the Pakistan NGOs Forum, its Secretary Meraj Humayun Khan endorsed the outright rejection of the draft CoC. She stressed the need to make the government itself accountable to the public, since it receives huge amounts of foreign funding every year. She added that the NGOs were bringing in development funds and were totally transparent and accountable to both the public and the government regulatory bodies. She feared that the draft CoC would empower the regulators to de-register any NGO on subjective grounds, and to interfere in the NGOs' work and functioning. She demanded that the government acknowledge and appreciate the substantial contributions of NGOs over the past two decades.

Naeem Mirza of the Aurat Foundation categorically denied the government's claim, which had appeared in a recent press release from the Ministry of Social Welfare, that all the NGOs in the country had endorsed the government's draft CoC during a consultation process. "We have not supported the draft CoC in any so-called consultation process rather we were invited to the consultation where we raised our serious concerns but unfortunately the government put aside all those concerns" he added. Shabana Arif of Rozan stated that this MoSW press release only served to show the government's mala fide intent, which would cast a shadow over any future government invitations to NGOs for participation in any workshops or seminars.

A lengthy Q&A session followed, in which it emerged that there was the unanimous view amongst all civil society participants that the draft CoC should be rejected completely.

The following points were resolved:

- Pakistan NGOs Forum and its regional Coalitions totally reject the government's draft CoC and the subsequent draft law;
- NGOs follow their own comprehensive Code of Conduct VOLUNTARILY, as an ethical responsibility, and the government is invited to participate in this CoC;
- NGOs are already registered and strictly regulated by a number of Government of Pakistan Regulatory bodies, and are accountable to them: thus no further CoC is needed;
- NGOs demand a conducive, enabling environment to carry out their work, whether it be providing social services, poverty reduction, charity, or defending human rights and advocating women's and minorities' basic rights.

### **Emerging Politico-Strategic Scenario in FATA**

February 19, 2007

While highlighting the internal and regional security dimensions of militancy in the Tribal Areas, the seminar

speakers urged the government to devise a comprehensive policy to initiate political, legal and administrative reforms in FATA.

Ijaz Khattak of Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, in his presentation on "Militancy in FATA and its Regional Implications" maintained that resolution of the FATA conflict was tied in with reforms, democratization in FATA and the peaceful resolution of issues between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. He also urged the need for a global, forward-looking strategy, which could address global governance issues such as human rights, development and the rule of law. He added that terrorism was a global systematic issue while the US policies were only US-centric and that peace cannot be restored in a one sector if war was raging in other sectors. He said that FATA was a sub-sector of the 'War against Terrorism' in Afghanistan and Pakistan: these countries were two important theaters in this war in which different local, regional and international state and non-state players were pursuing their own conflicting interests. He said that the US was not comfortable with Pakistan's position on this issue, as according to Western perceptions, Pakistan was both part of the problem and part of the solution. Therefore the US continues to urge Islamabad to do more in the war on terror, he added.

Mr. Khattak put forward certain probable developments if Pakistan was unable to deal with religious extremism, the Taliban and/or terrorists in FATA to the satisfaction of the Western powers. Those developments included direct interventions in FATA by NATO and the US and Pakistan's reactions to such a scenario. Other possibilities discussed were the reversal of the India-Pakistan peace process and some unpredictable developments in the US-Iran relationship.

Zubair Mahsood, Faculty of Law, University of Peshawar, while giving a brief background of FATA and its administrative and judicial structures, urged the government to announce political, legal and administrative reforms in FATA, so as to establish the writ of the law in the area. He lamented that instead of initiating a genuine reform process, successive governments have been making only superficial changes adding that the FATA was today formally part of Pakistan but more closely resembled a colony whose population was living under laws and administrative arrangements that set it apart from the rest of the state. He said that Pakistan had retained the colonial administrative legal structure, codified in a special legal framework, the FCR of 1901. He regretted that the state justified its failure to meet its obligations to the citizens there on the grounds of Pashtun tribal customs and norms. "FATA is not an ungovernable territory but the state had elected to govern it through local proxies and draconian colonial-era administrative structures and law, depriving local people of constitutionally guaranteed civil and political rights and protection of the courts." According to him it was the poor governance, combined with a long history of official support for Islamist Pashtun proxies in Afghanistan, which was feeding the growth of militancy and extremism

in FATA.

Aimal Khan of SDPI speaking on "Peace Deals or Strategic Policy Blunders" maintained that military operations in the area had led to an unprecedented increase in anti-US and anti-army sentiments. Religious feelings converged with nationalist sentiments and an insurgency-like situation had emerged in certain tribal areas particularly in Waziristan. The military operations in the area not only stirred strong resistance among the public but there were also resentments and reservations within the establishment. The government was forced to devise an exit strategy to scale down the tension and to minimize the political and military costs. Striking deals with local militants was part of this exit strategy, he added. While analyzing the outcome of different deals (Shakai 1, Shakai 2 or Wana Five, Sarogha and finally the Wana Peace Accord) done under the exit strategy, he said that these deals ended up with 'win-lose' situation; win for militants and lose for the government. "It was a win situation for the militants because the deals legitimized the militants as a major actor in tribal areas, the militants emerged emboldened, running a parallel government and their writ was increasing in these areas. It was 'lose' situation for the government as these deals were widely criticized both internally and externally. Also, pressure was mounting for the revision or dissolution of these agreements; the government writ was evidently weakened; militancy increased, illegal cross-border movement remained unchecked and target killing continued leading to the visible presence of foreign elements in FATA, the consolidation of Talibanization and its spillover to settled areas" he maintained.

### **Withering Law and Order: Who Is Responsible?**

February 26, 2007

The speakers argued that improving law and order was a collective responsibility of the government, political parties and other civil society actors so there was a dire need for a dialogue among all these stakeholders over this issue. They demanded that the rule of law be established, the Constitution upheld, and free and fair elections be held in the country to curb increasing violent trends as a truly democratic culture in the country would improve the situation. The speakers denounced killing of innocent people for any reason and declared this an inhuman and un-Islamic practice.

Hafiz Hussain Ahmad of the MMA, after elaborating the sufferings of Muslims in Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir and Afghanistan, said that world's sole super power, America, was destroying world peace in the name of bringing peace and stability. He said that foreign dictations, threats and dancing of our rulers to others' tunes have worsened the law and order situation in Pakistan. He said that historically our western border had been peaceful but the wrong policies of the present rulers made it unsafe for us. He said that his party facilitated the peace accord between the local militants and government but the Americans sabotaged it, as it was contrary to their interests. He denounced the act of suicide bombing, as Islam strictly prohibited the killing of not only

humans but also animals. However, he stressed the need to address the roots causes leading to such acts "It is the circumstances, which were compelling the youth to blow themselves up", he noted.

While referring to the situation in Balochistan, he said that the Opposition and he himself had tried their best to play an effective role in normalizing the situation in Balochistan but the Agencies foiled all attempts for a negotiated settlement of the crisis. Advocating dialogue, he lamented that military solutions could not solve the problem.

Mehnaz Raffi of PML (Q) said that every Pakistani was seriously concerned over the alarming law and order condition in the country. She said that the government could not handle such a crucial matter alone and underlined the need for a sincere dialogue at different levels to address the matter. According to her, the situation in the country before 1977 was far better in this respect, but several factors had drastically affected the internal situation of Pakistan. "The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan; emergence of the Taliban and their desire to convert Pakistan according to their beliefs, negative role of some religious parties, secret role of some anti-Pakistan countries to prevent Pakistan becoming a stronger state and most importantly, the events of 9/11, have significantly impacted Pakistan's internal situation".

Farhatullah Babar of the PPPP noted the need to address the key issues, which were creating a worsening state of law and order in the country. He lamented that there was no respect for law and the Constitution, which was the biggest reason for the worsening law and order situation. "Where law exists, there is no order and where order exists, there is no law" he declared. Discussing other reasons, he said that crimes of law and order were increasing because of so-called ideological grounds, the weakening of the civil service structure, politically motivated amendments in the Police Order 2002, and the mishandling of some critical issues such as Balochistan and FATA.

Agha Murtaza Poya of the Pakistan Awami Tehreek suggested upholding the rule of law and the centrality of human perspectives in all policies as being useful in resolving the weakening law and order situation. He also said that the absence of the rule of law and disrespect for the Constitution under subsequent martial law regimes, compounded by external factors such as the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the prolonged Iran-Iraq war, the unjustified occupation of Kashmir by India; discriminatory American policies at the global level and its unwise support to Israel have been contributing factors towards shaping the current conditions in Pakistani.

Dr. Inayatullah of the Council of Social Sciences (COSS) said that instead of talking about the law and order situation in a given country, we should focus on protecting humankind. He said that four global issues, namely global warming, a 'culture' of war and violence, over-population and weapons of mass destruction were some of the most critical challenges of today.

# SDPI Center for Capacity Building



## Activities: January – March 2007

The SDPI Center for Capacity Building (CCB) provides high quality training to the public, private and NGO sector organizations and individuals to strengthen institutions and to build capacities for sustainable development. During January and February, CCB conducted the following training courses:

### Training Workshop on Environmental Governance 09 – 11 January, 2007

Environmental governance refers to the way people and the government manage the environment for socio-economic development that is sustainable. Appropriate national policies and legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks must create linkages between various aspects of good governance. This can only be done when strategic environmental issues are integrated with economic and social development programs.

The Workshop was designed for officials working in various government Departments, including environmental protection, planning and development, agriculture, public health, engineering, population planning, irrigation and power, forestry, wildlife and fisheries, as well as for civil society organizations involved in environmental issues.

The workshop objectives were to enable participants to:

- Understand the links between environmental governance and sustainable development;
- Learn about the various components of a framework for environmental governance; and
- Evaluate proposals and policies for the above framework.

### Training Workshop on Developing Communication and Presentation Skills 16 – 18 January, 2007

Inter-personal skills are a defining feature of successful leaders and effective managers. The art of effective communication and good presentation enables project managers to give clear directions to their teams. Speakers or negotiators who can articulate their ideas are more likely to obtain favorable responses and commitments from listeners. It is therefore essential that managers learn the techniques of effective communication and presentation.

The Workshop was designed to benefit persons



who have to make presentations to different kinds of audiences in the government, private and non-profit sectors, including senior and mid-level managers, designers, marketing and sales persons, educationists, engineers, and social organizers.

The workshop was designed to enable participants to:

- Understand the process and essentials of an effective communication;
- Become familiar with the guidelines for understanding the audience/building rapport;
- Understand the techniques and methods of preparing and delivering effective presentations;
- Formulate and practice anticipated questions and their responses;
- Design and deliver a live presentation.

### Training Workshop on Project Based Accounting and Cost Centres for NGOs 23 – 25 January, 2007

Computers through software now work as accountants, but project-based accounting is a special type of accounting through which it is possible to ascertain the profit or loss of a specific project and to know which project components require enhanced allocation. Understanding of cost centres is a prerequisite for this task. NGOs having a portfolio of various projects need to be very specific about such accounting and their cost centres.

This workshop was designed for middle and upper middle level management of NGOs and other organizations involved in project accounting, project

## **SDPI Center for Capacity Building**

coordination, and monitoring and evaluation of projects in the public and private sectors. This workshop was also helpful for those who are dealing in taxation, budgets, accounts and financial matters.

The main objectives were to enable participants to understand:

- basic accounting concepts;
- financial statements and other relevant reports;
- budgeting techniques;
- laws that affect accounting in NGOs;
- project based accounting;
- cost centres in organizations.

### **Environmental Impact Assessment of Development Projects**

13 – 15 February, 2007

EIA aims to assess environmental impact at an early stage of project planning, design and development and to build into the project alternative ways and means so as to mitigate any adverse effects. An EIA results in environmentally-friendly and cost-effective projects. It is an essential part of project design and appraisal. It has been emphasized in many private and public *fora* that there is a dire need for institutional and personal capacity building in this area.

Participants from public, private, NGO sector and UN organization attended the training. They also carried out an EIA of a development project for the proposed Islamabad Railway Station.

The overarching aim of this training workshop was to enable the participants to build their capacity to integrate environmental concerns into project proposals. The specific objectives were to enable the participants to:


- learn the principles, skills, procedures and practices of integrating environment through EIA;
- become aware of the legal and regulatory obligations of integrating environmental concerns into development projects;
- familiarize themselves with the techniques of getting public participation and integrating socio-economic aspects in development projects; and
- conduct an EIA study for a development project.

### **Technical Report Writing**

06 – 08 March, 2007

Technical (scientific, engineering, research) reports have special requirements. If not done well, they fail to achieve the objective for which they are written. Unfortunately, technical writing for many professionals remains a weak area. It is not systematically taught in academic institutions. Individuals learn these skills through self or peer

teaching by hit and trial methods, which may take many years. An inadequate expertise in this skill may mean lost opportunities and difficulties in career development. This training workshop was designed to enable the participants to improve their knowledge and acquire skills in technical writing.



An experience sharing training approach for skill development was adopted. The session plans, besides lectures, were developed around group work, practices and presentations. Based on the feedback on earlier training programmes, sessions were modified to optimise satisfaction of the participants and achieve objectives of the workshop.

The workshop objectives were to:

- Understand the aims and elements of technical writing;
- Understand the components of a technical and research report;
- Improve their knowledge of drafting, editing, documentation and presentation of technical reports;
- Generate logical arguments through critical and creative thinking;
- Analyse data using statistical package for social sciences (SPSS).

### **Enhancing Secretarial Skills**

20 – 22 March, 2007

An efficient and effective office secretary builds good image of an organization and proves to be an asset to his/her supervisor. Information technology has brought about a paradigm shift in office working and the skills required by office secretaries. Decision makers are overloaded by information and data so they need skillfully trained office secretaries to stream line the flow of information. The more skills secretaries have, the more time their organizational heads will save and the organization as a whole will become more effective.

It was an interactive course. Participants worked

individually and in groups and practiced various aspects of secretarial work. Exercises included prioritization, letter writing, organizing meetings and interpersonal communications. Role-plays and videos were used to bring out relevant lessons.

The specific objectives were to enable the participants to:

- develop an understanding of effective office environment;
- segregate important tasks and prioritize them;
- learn how to effectively deal with internal and external customers;
- know how to write various types of letters/memos;
- learn techniques of effective oral and written communication.

## Coming up! Trainings

- Performance Appraisal/Performance Management (10 – 12 July 2007)
- Developing Project Proposals (31 July to 02 August 2007)

- Leadership Skills for Women: Conflict Management and Negotiation Styles (07 – 09 August 2007)
- Creative Thinking and Sound Decision Making (04 – 06 September 2007)
- Environmental Impact Assessment (23 – 25 October 2007)
- Training of Trainers (06 – 08 November 2007)
- Enhancing Secretarial Skills (20 – 22 November 2007)
- Time Management (04 – 06 December 2007)

For further information on SDPI's training program and courses being offered, please contact:

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*Continued from page 10*

## The Army's Role in Humanitarian Assistance

impatient and agitated against the ban on temporary shelters, with the result that the Administration had to back down.

The problem seems to lie in the failure to bridge the gap between community expectations, which represent real time, and the master/relocation plans, which reflect virtual time, thanks to their elaborate nature, the rigid building codes embedded in them, as well as the extended time horizons. It is also the case that relocation, as and when it does occur, will likely be in a 'command and control' mode, rather than being incentive based, in recognition of the underlying socio-cultural realities. The upshot is that the reconstruction process is inverting on itself and moving at a snail's pace, despite the large infusions of funds. This is worrisome: in the short term, communities have to brace themselves against another harsh winter; over a longer period shelter is pivotal to re-establishing livelihoods.

In general, ERRA policies reflect an unwillingness to share authority or take decisions consultatively, as is reflected by its interaction with NGOs and Partner Organisations. Its protocol is guided by the bureaucratic Army tradition, requiring detailed MoUs, and NOCs. Smaller donors, some INGOs and most local NGOs have criticised the army and ERRA policies publicly. Others have resigned themselves to complying with ERRA regulations so as to stay involved in relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts.

Many civil society organizations claim that ERRA refuses to share data; however, others are equally vocal that the Army has provided detailed maps and shared lists of widows and orphans in villages. There is also criticism that ERRA excludes from compensation those houses which have not been damaged but are vulnerable to further tremors. However, ERRA appears to have responded to this criticism by bringing such houses into the fold.

In our assessment of the Army's role in humanitarian operations, we have tried to move away from ideological biases and present a synthesis of views from the field. At the outset, the army arrogated Constitutional authority, helped in no small measure by the fact that there were no institutions in place with the means or the reach to supplant it. The field reactions with regard to relief operations which, traditionally, the Army does best, were positive. However, when push came to shove, humanitarian concerns did give way to organizational and strategic imperatives. The Army's role in reconstruction is less overt to the extent that it conceals its authority behind the civilian façade of ERRA. However, the façade is quickly exposed when it comes to decision-making and implementation, and bears all the classic Army hallmarks of rigidity and central control. As reconstruction is delayed and affectees are forced to relocate, perhaps civil society, donors and legislators will mobilize in search of more sustainable institutional solutions.

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